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The State Tax Dilemma
States, often hamstrung by state
constitutional balanced budget requirements
preventing deficit spending, must reduce
services (or increase taxes) if revenue is
1
insufficient to fund them. To maintain revenue
and services, states have sought — sometimes
aggressively — additional sources of tax
revenue. As earnings of athletes and entertainers
increased, for example, states began taxing a
portion of their earnings from playing or

performing occasionally in the state.2 Similarly,
use tax payment lines began to appear on state
3
income tax returns. In response to the increasing
volume of sales by remote vendors, taxing
authorities sought to require them to collect use
4
taxes on goods shipped into the state. This
strategy was bolstered significantly by the
Supreme Court decision in South Dakota v.
5
Wayfair Inc. Unlike “Amazon” laws imposing
use tax collection obligations on out-of-state
vendors that have a physical presence in the
taxing state, Wayfair enables states to require outof-state vendors without a physical presence in
the taxing state to collect use tax on the taxing
6
state’s behalf. Some states have been slow to
implement legislation using the authority that
Wayfair provides, but it is likely that all states
with a sales and complementary use tax
ultimately will enact the legislation to ensure
collection of use tax revenue.7

2

See, for example, N.Y. Tax Law section 631; Mo. Rev. Stat. section
143.183 (2018); and Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State
Taxation, para. 20.05(4)(d), at 18 (2003).
3

For example, line 91 of California Form 505. Inclusion of use tax lines
has enjoyed limited success in the absence of third-party collection of use
taxes or reporting of sales to the state to resident purchasers. And for
athletes generally, see B. Anthony Billings, Kyungjin Kim, and Jeanette
A. Boles, “Taxation of Professional Athletes: Jock Taxes,” Tax Notes State,
Feb. 1, 2021, p. 451.
4

Institute for Local Self-Reliance, “Internet Sales Tax Fairness” (“In
2008, New York pioneered a policy strategy that effectively skirted the
constraints of Quill and forced Amazon, Overstock, and other web-only
retailers to collect the state’s sales tax.”).
5

South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 585 U.S. ___ (2018).

6

1

For example, Mo. Const. Art. III, section 37; and Mo. Const. Art. IV,
section 24. See generally Jared Walczak, “State Strategies for Closing FY
2020 With a Balanced Budget,” Tax Foundation (Apr. 2, 2020); and U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Briefing Report to the Chairman,
Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, “Balanced Budget
Requirements: State Experiences and Implications for the Federal
Government” (1993).

Wayfair overruled Supreme Court precedent in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), which required a physical presence but
invited Congress to change that requirement. Congress failed to act, and
the Supreme Court then reversed itself. For additional discussion, see
Henry Ordower, “Avoiding Federal and State Constitutional Limitations
in Taxation,” Tax Notes State, Aug. 24, 2020, p. 803.
7

Hannah Meehan, comment, “Leveling the Playing Field for Remote
Sellers: Missouri’s Response in a Post-Wayfair World,” 65 St. Louis U. L.J.
(forthcoming Mar. 2021).
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During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,
states with commuter destination cities like
Boston and New York City have been threatened
with loss of income tax revenue because
neighboring-state residents stopped physically
working in the commuter destination state. Some
of these states have asserted continuing taxing
jurisdiction over the wages resident employers
pay the employees working remotely from their
states of residence. New Hampshire has sued
Massachusetts under the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to resolve the interstate
8
dispute. The assertion of continuing taxing
jurisdiction risks saddling employees who
stopped commuting — possibly only temporarily
— with income tax obligations in both their state
of residence and the state where they previously
worked.
Residence states like New Jersey and
Connecticut ceded primary taxing jurisdiction to
the commuting destination state through a credit
against their state income tax for tax payable to
the state where the employee was working.9 These
states may deny the tax credit because, absent
physical presence of the employee in the
destination state, that state arguably no longer has
jurisdiction to collect the income tax. This quest
for enhanced state income tax revenue may mark
the beginning of increased competition among
10
states for individual incomes taxes.
Historically, states with income taxes11 tied
most of their income tax computations to federal
income tax computations, although each state
makes adjustments that distinguish the
computation of state taxable income from the
federal taxable income. The decision to follow
federal computations was sensible and simple.
That decision facilitated state reporting and

enabled states to rely primarily on federal
auditing and limited the amount of infrastructure
each state needed to enforce tax compliance.
Decoupling from the federal income tax is not a
new concept, but most decoupling was at
relatively low cost to the states. An example is the
capital gain preference. Except for a short period
following recodification of the Internal Revenue
Code in 1986, net capital gains of individuals and
trusts have enjoyed a rate preference under the
federal income tax12 but not under most state
income taxes. In recent years that separation
required no distinct computational mechanism
because it was simply the imposition of a rate on
net income. Earlier, when the preference at the
federal level was a deduction, the state had to
adjust federal adjusted gross income to tax capital
gain fully. States have decoupled from federal
income tax computations in other ways —
recently from the 2017 qualified business income
13
deduction. Colorado, Idaho, and North Dakota
follow the federal income tax deduction for
qualified business income; other states using
federal AGI as their computational point of
departure do not follow federal rules.
Consistent reliance on federal tax
computations does not prevent multiple state tax
impositions, but it does avoid some complexities
from differing computations. For businesses that
must apportion their revenue among states in
which they operate, inconsistent state
apportionment formulas yield confusion and
14
duplicative taxation. As states decouple from
federal income tax rules and assert broader taxing
jurisdiction than before, complexity and
discontinuities may grow and result in multiple
tax impositions.
This article addresses the structure of state
income taxes and credits for taxes paid by
residents to other states and the confusion that

8

New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, Sup. Ct. Dkt. No. 22O154 (Oct. 23,
2020) (challenging under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction the
extraterritorial reach of Massachusetts’s income tax into New Hampshire
on New Hampshire commuting employees’ wages when they are
working remotely without entering Massachusetts. New Hampshire
does not tax income from services. New Jersey does tax wage income
and joined other states in filing an amicus brief supporting New
Hampshire’s claim).
9

See N.J. Stat. Ann. section 54A:4-1 (West 2020).

10

Joseph N. Endres and Christopher L. Doyle, “New York’s Partial
Decoupling From the CARES Act,” Tax Notes State, Feb. 1, 2021, p. 417.
11

Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming have no income tax. New Hampshire and Tennessee do not
tax income from the performance of services, including wages.

796

12

IRC section 1(h). Before 1987 the rate preference was indirect
through a 50 or 60 percent net capital gain deduction or partial
exclusion. Net capital gain under section 1222(11) is the excess of net
long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss.
13

Section 199A, added by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017 (most
states begin their state income tax computation from federal AGI and the
qualified business income deduction is not an adjustment to federal
gross income, so it is not part of that computation).
14

R. Bruce Johnson, “The Multistate Tax Commission — Its History
and Its Future,” 6 St. & Loc. Tax Law. 45, 50-51 (2001); and Andrea Muse,
“States Trending Toward Single Sales Factor, Panelist Says,” Tax Notes
Today State, Jan. 27, 2021.
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nonuniform decoupling generates across state
borders. Separation from federal rules may help
to stanch the loss of state revenue from federal tax
15
amendments and enhance state tax revenue —
especially revenue that the state otherwise might
never capture but to which it may have a claim.
This article focuses on proposed legislation in
New York state that would tax the unrealized gain
and other deferred income of New York’s
billionaires16 and the complexities that
legislation’s enactment would likely generate. It
will consider responses from other jurisdictions to
ameliorate the discontinuity that the New York
legislation will cause as states seek to increase
their income tax revenue and capture a larger
share of the income tax base without running
afoul of constitutional limitations on states’ taxing
17
power, especially equal protection and the right
18
to travel.
Unrealized Appreciation and
Other Deferred Income
Among the features of the federal income tax
most favorable to wealthy taxpayers is the
realization requirement. Gain and loss are not
realized until the taxpayer chooses to sell
19
property. Inclusion of gain and loss in gross
income, referred to as recognition, generally
follows realization unless another tax provision
20
21
defers the recognition. With limited exceptions,
if a taxpayer does not choose to sell property, their
economic gain remains free from the income tax.
A taxpayer may dispose of property in several

15

When the federal rules for depreciation deductions accelerate
depreciation recovery — for example, the intended reduction of the
federal income tax is accompanied by reductions in state income taxes.
16

N.Y. S08277, 2019-2020 General Assembly. Many leading academics
urged enactment of the proposal in a December 9, 2020, letter to Gov.
Andrew Cuomo (D) and others.
17

Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564
(1997) (property tax exemption discriminating against out-of-state
residents violates equal protection).
18

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (recognizing fundamental right to
travel). Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. 564.
19

Section 1001(a) (gain is realized from the sale or other disposition of
property if the amount realized under section 1001(b) on sale exceeds the
taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property under section 1011).
20

Section 1001(c). Installment sales (section 453) defer inclusion in
income of realized and recognized gain and are not an exception to
recognition governed by section 1001.
21

Exceptions include mark-to-market inclusion for commodities and
other financial positions (section 1256), mark-to-market inclusion for
dealer securities (section 475), and the expatriation tax (section 877A).

ways without recognizing the economic gain
embedded in the property. The taxpayer may give
22
the property to others — even claiming a
charitable contribution deduction equal to the
value of the property23 — and exchange the
24
property for different property. The taxpayer
may monetize the appreciation in value by
borrowing against the security of the property
25
without disposing of it. If the appreciated
property passes from the taxpayer to another at
death, the embedded economic gain permanently
escapes income taxation because the decedent’s
estate receives a new basis in the property equal to
its fair market value on the decedent’s date of
26
death against which to measure gain or loss.
Combining the realization requirement and
the new basis at death enables affluent taxpayers
who hold much of their wealth in appreciated
property to escape both federal and state income
tax on their economic gains. States have no federal
constitutional or statutory obligation to follow
federal taxation rules or principles, but it is
customary for them to do so. Even if realization
were a requirement under the 16th Amendment
definition of income, as it originally may have

22

Section 1001(c) (requiring a sale or exchange for recognition) and
section 102 (no inclusion of value of gift in recipient’s income); and
section 1015 (donee takes donor’s basis if the donor is living, thereby
preserving the donor’s economic gain for inclusion if the donee sells the
property).
23

Section 170 (charitable contribution deduction).

24

Section 1031 (nonrecognition of realized gain if the taxpayer
exchanges real property for like-kind property); section 1034
(nonrecognition of realized gain if the taxpayer reinvests the proceeds
from an involuntary disposition of property in property that is related in
service or use); section 351 (nonrecognition of gain on exchange of
property for corporate stock); and section 721 (likewise for a partnership
or limited liability company interest).
25

Borrowing money does not yield includable income because the
taxpayer has an obligation to repay the borrowed funds even if the
taxpayer is not personally obligated to repay because the borrowing is
without recourse. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 US. 1 (1947).
26

Section 1014(a) (property received from a decedent’s estate has an
adjusted basis equal to the FMV of the property at the decedent’s date of
death without regard to the decedent’s adjusted basis in the property
while alive). The new basis at death rule does not apply to property that
would yield income with respect to a decedent under section 691
including retirement accounts, other than Roth IRAs, and installment
sale contracts. Section 1014(c). The new basis at death rule was changed
twice to a rule requiring recipients of property from a decedent to
continue the decedent’s pre-death basis. The first change in 1976
enacting section 1023 (repealed 1977) while the second change applied
only to decedents dying in 2010, a year in which there was no estate tax.
Repeal of this rule may become part of President Biden’s proposals to
increase taxes on wealthy taxpayers. Paul Sullivan, “The Estate Tax May
Change Under Biden, Affecting Far More People,” The New York Times,
Jan. 15, 2021.
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27

been interpreted to be, states are free to adopt
their own income definitions and reject both the
realization requirement and the new basis at
death rule. Nevertheless, states have uniformly,
and understandably, followed federal taxation on
these matters. Perhaps the stress on state
28
treasuries from the pandemic marks the moment
for states to capture additional revenue by
decoupling further from federal tax rules.
While the realization requirement affords all
property owners the opportunity to enjoy
increases in property value without current
taxation, the loss of potential tax revenue from
failure to tax economic appreciation is troubling.
29
30
Commentators and politicians have argued that
both the realization requirement and the new
31
basis at death rule have become obsolete.
Without providing relief for some taxpayers,
changing the rule may prove politically
problematic in that it might compel homeowners
to sell or encumber their homes to raise the funds
32
needed to pay the tax on appreciation in value.
Where great wealth is involved, however,
eliminating this opportunity to avoid taxation of
gain is appealing and a potential source of muchneeded tax revenue.
The New York Mark-to-Market Tax
Against this background and consistent with
calls to increase taxes on the wealthy, the
proposed legislation in New York would tax
billionaires on much of their deferred income and
the unrealized appreciation in their assets. If

27

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211-12 (1920).

28

The coronavirus began to spread in early 2020. A Dictionary of
Epidemiology 179 (2008); and World Health Organization, “WHO
Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on
COVID-19” (Mar. 11, 2020).
29

This commentator, for example: Ordower, “Capital, an Elusive Tax
Object and Impediment to Sustainable Taxation,” 23 Fla. Tax Rev. 625
(2020); and Ordower, “Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax:
Toward a Comprehensive Tax Base,” 67 Buffalo L. Rev. 1371 (2019).
30

See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, “Wyden Unveils Proposal to
Fix Broken Tax Code, Equalize Treatment of Wages and Wealth, Protect
Social Security” (Sept. 12, 2019); and Joseph J. Thorndike, “Biden Wants
to Reform the Capital Gains Preference — It Will Be Hard,” Tax Notes
State, Feb. 1, 2021, p. 473.
31

Harry L. Gutman, “Taxing Gains at Death,” Tax Notes Federal, Jan.
11, 2021, p. 269.
32

This concern has been raised repeatedly regarding ad valorem real
property taxes and contributed to successful voter tax limitation
initiatives, including Proposition 13 in California.

798

33

enacted, the mark-to-market (MTM) tax would
require resident billionaires to realize and
recognize gain for New York income tax purposes
as if they had sold all their assets, including
pension savings plans, at their FMVs on July 1,
2020. Taxpayers subject to the MTM tax would be
able spread the additional tax liability over 10
years but must pay a 7.5-percent-per-annum
charge on the deferred amounts. Special valuation
rules would seek to eliminate any value
discounting the taxpayer has undertaken. For
purposes of determining whether a taxpayer is a
billionaire, the net FMV of their assets is enhanced
under rules akin to constructive ownership rules34
by the assets of related persons, including spouse,
minor children, some private foundations to
which the billionaire has contributed, and assets
the billionaire transferred to third parties by gift
within the previous five years. Billionaires who
had been residents of New York for fewer than
five years as of July 1, 2020, may increase the
adjusted bases of their assets for purposes of the
MTM tax to FMV on the date they became a
resident. That basis increase, as opposed to the
basis increase following inclusion of MTM gain in
income, must not apply to basis for purposes of an
actual sale. If it did, it would offer less-than-fiveyear residents of New York a planning
opportunity to escape state tax on much of their
unrealized gain. After 2020, the MTM tax becomes
an annual mark-to-market inclusion requirement
for resident billionaires.
Enactment of the MTM tax and its effective
35
date, if enacted, are unknown. The pending
legislation would apply to billionaires who were
New York residents on July 1, 2020 — a date now
past. Because the legislation was introduced on
May 1, 2020, a non-domiciled billionaire with a
permanent abode in the state had only a short
window during which to avoid the 183-day
residency definition,36 and thus imposition of the
33

Whether New York’s proposal is a serious contender for passage is
doubtful. See, e.g., Luis Ferré-Sadurní and Jesse McKinley, “Cuomo
Offers Doomsday Proposal to Attack a Possible $15 Billion Deficit,” The
New York Times, Jan. 19, 2021.
34

Section 318.

35

Anna Gronewold, “Cuomo Warns of Tax Hikes, Dire Cuts if Feds
Can’t Find $15B,” Politico, Jan. 19, 2021.
36

N.Y. Tax Law section 605(b)(1) (B). Section 605(b)(1)(A) includes
another test for taxpayers domiciled in New York without a permanent
abode.
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tax. Had New York offered more time between the
proposed effective date and the introduction of
the legislation, its billionaires might have
established residence in another state to avoid the
tax and the tax would not produce revenue as
37
planned. Even if the proposal fails, it may be a
harbinger of future MTM tax legislation in states
needing to increase tax revenue.
Exit and Continuation Taxes
Rather than taxing billionaires immediately
on all economic gain, a state might tax gain
accrued during residence when the taxpayer
ceases to be a state resident. New York could
have used such a tax to backstop a longer period
between introduction and effective date. While
the United States and other countries, including
Canada, impose a tax on expatriating
individuals that requires them to include
deferred income and mark their assets to market
and include gain as if they had sold their assets
38
on the date of expatriation, a state seeking
similarly to tax those who cease to be residents
might run afoul of the constitutional right to
travel. Such a tax advances the legitimate state
interest of protecting its tax base by preventing
appreciation and deferred compensation that
accrued during a taxpayer’s resident period from
permanently escaping the state’s income tax.
Insofar as the state could have taxed the income
when earned or accrued, but permitted the tax
benefit of deferral, the state has a rational basis
for taxing the income when it is about to lose
39
taxing jurisdiction over the taxpayer. Moreover,
the federal prohibition on the alternate scheme of
a continuation tax on retirement fund
distributions, discussed below, limits the state’s
ability to capture that tax revenue another way.
Nevertheless, immediate and burdensome
taxation of deferred income and unrealized
appreciation when taxpayers relocate is likely to

deter taxpayers from changing their state of
residence and perhaps excessively burdens their
40
fundamental right to travel.
Paralleling an expatriation tax is a
41
continuation tax. A continuation tax does not
impose any immediate burden when the
taxpayer changes their state of residence.
Instead, the taxpayer’s previous residence state
taxes the portion of deferred income and
includable gain that accrued while the taxpayer
was resident when the taxable event — that is,
receipt of payment or sale of property — occurs.
Several state courts have held such a tax to be
constitutional and permissible, but federal
legislation now prohibits states from asserting
continued taxing jurisdiction over some types of
42
retirement income of previous residents. Given
this federal prohibition and the uncertainty
about the constitutionality of an exit tax,
decoupling from the federal computation of
income, including abandonment of the
realization requirement and other federal
income deferral rules, becomes an attractive
structural change to bolster state tax collection
and protect the state tax base from future
revenue loss accompanying changes of
43
residence.
The MTM Tax and Other States
With its effective date of July 1, 2020, the
proposed MTM tax stands to generate significant
revenue quickly for New York from resident
billionaires who missed the opportunity to
change their residence to a state not considering

40

Id. at 10-11 (Right to travel was not before the Court in Nordlinger; it
is an argument that could be brought in the future.). In the EU, a French
expatriation tax was held to violate the Treaty of Rome because it
burdens free movement. Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v.
Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2452.
41

Compare IRC section 877 (taxing an expatriate on income following
expatriation).
42

37

For an argument that a challenge to the MTM tax on grounds of
constitutionally impermissible retroactivity would fail, see Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah et al., “Is New York’s Mark-to-Market Act Unconstitutionally
Retroactive?” Tax Notes State, Feb. 8, 2021, p. 541.
38

IRC section 877A.

39

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (applying a rational basis
standard of review to the California property tax assessment scheme of
Proposition 13 despite its likely increased tax burden on taxpayers
moving to California).

4 U.S.C. section 114 (2017); and Hellerstein and Hellerstein, State
Taxation, para. 20.07, at 9 (2003) (In 1996 Congress enacted legislation
prohibiting a state from imposing “an income tax on any retirement
income of an individual who is not a resident or domiciliary of such
State (as determined under the laws of such State).”).
43

New York has many taxpayers who retire to low-state-income-tax
jurisdictions such as Florida and Texas collecting their deferred pension
compensation from New York employment free from New York state
tax. Alexandre Tanzi and Wei Lu, “Even Before Covid 2,600 People a
Week Were Leaving New York City,” Bloomberg, Dec. 5, 2020; and Jack
Kelly, “New Yorkers Are Leaving the City in Droves: Here’s Why They’re
Moving and Where They’re Going,” Forbes, Sept. 5, 2019.
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44

a similar tax. Operation of the MTM tax raises
issues regarding harmonization of tax rules
among states and poses a serious risk of double
or multiple impositions of income tax on the
same income and gain. There is also a question
whether the tax might be a wealth tax imposed
ad valorem on property. If it is, and it burdens
intangible personal property, the New York state
45
constitution prohibits it. Further questions arise
whether the tax unreasonably discriminates
against a class of taxpayers, but the class of
billionaires hardly seems worthy of
constitutionally enhanced scrutiny and
protection.
Tax Basis Discontinuity Under the MTM Tax
A few examples suffice to illustrate the
complex range of basis and double tax issues that
enactment of the MTM tax will generate.
Example 1. Taxpayer (T), a billionaire resident
in New York for more than five years, owns
appreciated real property in New Jersey. The
MTM tax includes the unrealized appreciation in
the property in T’s New York income tax. Two
years later, T sells the property. New Jersey
follows federal computations and taxes the gain
based on T’s adjusted basis, not as increased
following imposition of the MTM tax, but
following federal adjusted basis. Because the gain
would not be taxable in New York, insofar as T
has an increased basis in New York, the gain
would not generate a credit in New York for the
New Jersey tax. New Jersey would not credit the
earlier MTM tax because the tax credit structure
always has the resident taxing jurisdiction ceding
tax to the nonresident jurisdiction, not vice versa,
as is the case here.
Example 2. T, as in Example 1, following
imposition of the MTM tax, moves to New Jersey.
After establishing residency there, T sells
44

Revenue estimates for the MTM Act are $23.3 billion in additional
revenue for New York for 2020, and another $1.2 billion in each
subsequent year.
45

N.Y. State Const. Art. 16, section 3 provides in part: “Intangible
personal property shall not be taxed ad valorem nor shall any excise tax
be levied solely because of the ownership or possession thereof, except
that the income therefrom may be taken into consideration in computing
any excise tax measured by income generally.” This section would seem
to prohibit New York from taxing the amount included under IRC
section 965 because the section further states: “Undistributed profits
shall not be taxed.” See supra note 16 letter to Gov. Cuomo arguing that
the proposed tax is on income, not property.

800

corporate shares that were subject to the MTM tax
in New York. T is taxable in New Jersey on the
gain following federal adjusted basis. T no longer
is taxable in New York, so there is no tax in New
York against which to credit the New Jersey tax,
and New Jersey would not need to credit the
earlier MTM tax and New York would not refund
the earlier MTM tax when T is correctly taxed in
New Jersey. Because the MTM tax increases the
basis in T’s assets as it imposes the tax, T can avoid
the New Jersey imposition by selling all T’s assets
before changing residence. That choice would
make little sense to T because T would become
subject to federal income tax as well — hardly a
reasonable trade-off for avoiding a possible future
New Jersey income tax on some of T’s assets.
Many other examples will suggest themselves
readily that result in the same income taxed under
the now-differing state rules by two states
without a resident tax credit available because the
years of tax imposition differ. T in the examples
could avoid the result in Example 2 by not
changing residence.
The Example 1 double tax is more difficult to
avoid other than by selling all non-New York real
property in the same year as the MTM tax takes
effect, but that is no longer possible if New York
adheres to its 2020 effective date to prevent
billionaires from changing residence to avoid the
tax and would trigger the federal income tax if it
were possible. New Jersey might consider taxing
the gain on the New Jersey property when New
York taxes it under the MTM tax to force New
York to offer a tax credit for the New Jersey tax
and cede the tax revenue to New Jersey. This tax
in New Jersey violates precedents under which
states may not tax out-of-state taxpayers less
46
favorably than resident taxpayers. New Jersey
might generalize the tax and apply it to its
residents as well, but that change would be
without substance because there would be no
occasion on which the MTM tax would be
imposed on a non-New York resident, but it may
be imposed when there is a difference in
determining the taxpayer’s state of residence.
New York may alter the proposed MTM tax to
provide a refund of the tax when the income is

46

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. 564.
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properly taxed in another jurisdiction. The
proposal does not do so, although it would
provide a credit for a similar tax imposed by
another jurisdiction before imposition of the
MTM tax. New York also might offer a
generalized future credit against New York tax
liability for these duplicative taxes without
limiting the credit to matching income source
with creditable out-of-state tax, as most resident
credits do. But if the taxpayer does not own New
York property and never resides in New York
again, this credit would be of little value.
The reaction of other states to enactment of
the MTM tax would be to follow New York and
impose a like tax on their residents — certainly a
difficult political challenge. The New York
proposal, however, is not compelling for other
states. When it would become effective, New
York residents who previously were residents of
another state would get a credit against the New
York tax for an MTM-like tax paid in another
state. No state ever has imposed such a tax, so the
credit means nothing. The MTM tax would also
permit new residents of New York — under the
proposal meaning those resident for fewer than
five years — to increase the basis of their assets
to FMV on the date they become residents, so
they are taxable under the MTM tax only on
value increases accruing since they became New
York residents. The new residents would retain
their historical bases for purposes of the regular
income tax lest they escape the New York income
tax when they sell assets while New York
residents. The basis complexity is manifest
insofar as imposition of the MTM tax results in
an increase in New York basis both for regular
income tax and MTM tax inclusion purposes so
as not to tax the same income in New York twice.
The proposal is unclear on status changes. If
a resident of another state who is not a billionaire
has substantially appreciated assets when they
move to New York and does not become a
billionaire until they have been a resident for six
years, the MTM tax would be imposed in the
sixth year. The MTM tax proposal is unclear
regarding whether the taxpayer’s basis for
purposes of the tax became FMV when the
taxpayer became a New York resident regardless
of their billionaire status at that time. If that
becomes the rule, anyone moving to New York

who aspires to become a billionaire would have
to determine the value of all their assets when
they become a New York resident and maintain
that record to protect against the MTM tax. But
for purposes of the New York resident income
tax on realized gain and collection of deferred
compensation, the basis remains the smaller
historical basis.
To avoid many of these problems for their
residents who might move to New York sometime
in the future, other states would enact a tax like the
MTM tax, but at a lower threshold determined by
the relative likelihood that someone will become a
billionaire more than five years after moving to
New York. New Jersey might set that level at a mere
$500 million, for example, and Connecticut at $400
million of assets, thereby setting off a race to the
bottom by other states whose residents might
someday move to New Jersey or Connecticut.
Ultimately, the outcome would become current
taxation of appreciation in value and the
elimination of deferred compensation for state tax
purposes — that is, virtually complete decoupling
from the federal income tax, ideally under uniform
47
rules across state borders. New York should take a
leadership role in transitioning to broad-based
mark-to-market taxation, as such decoupling may
encourage Congress to eliminate many of the
deferrals that are available and to include in
taxpayers’ incomes the annual change in value of all
taxpayers’ assets under a mark-to-market system.
Such a system would eliminate the need for a new
basis at death since unrealized appreciation would
be taxed annually under a Schanz-Haig-Simons
comprehensive tax base.48


47

Uniformity has been elusive on sales tax matters and revenue
apportionment despite the efforts of the Multistate Tax Commission but
has been more successful in major metropolitan areas on matters like
mass transit and environmental controls.
48

Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a
Problem of Fiscal Policy 49 (1938).
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